

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS  
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

**SUMMARY ORDER**

THIS SUMMARY ORDER WILL NOT BE PUBLISHED IN THE FEDERAL REPORTER AND MAY NOT BE CITED AS PRECEDENTIAL AUTHORITY TO THIS OR ANY OTHER COURT, BUT MAY BE CALLED TO THE ATTENTION OF THIS OR ANY OTHER COURT IN A SUBSEQUENT STAGE OF THIS CASE, IN A RELATED CASE, OR IN ANY CASE FOR PURPOSES OF COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL OR RES JUDICATA.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the United States Courthouse, Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 8th day of April, two thousand and three.

PRESENT:

Hon. John M. Walker, Jr.,  
Chief Judge,  
Hon. James L. Oakes,  
Hon. Jon O. Newman,  
Circuit Judges.

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MARBLE HILL ONEIDA INDIANS,

Plaintiff-Intervenor-Appellant,

DOCKET No.: 02-6171

- v. -

THE ONEIDA INDIAN NATION OF NEW YORK STATE,  
a/k/a Oneida Indians of New York, a/k/a Oneida  
Indian Nation of New York, ONEIDA INDIAN OF  
WISCONSIN, THE THAMES BAND OF CANADA (ONEIDA),

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

UNITED STATES of America and NEW YORK  
BROTHERTOWN INDIAN NATION,

Plaintiffs-Intervenors-Appellees,

THE COUNTY OF MADISON, NEW YORK, COUNTY OF ONEIDA,  
NEW YORK, and THE STATE OF NEW YORK,

Defendants.

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APPEARING FOR MARBLE HILL  
ONEIDA INDIANS

Philip H. Gitlen, Whiteman,  
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APPEARING FOR THE ONEIDA  
INDIAN NATION OF NEW YORK

Caroline A. Judge, Zuckerman  
Spaeder LLP, Washington DC,  
(William W. Taylor, Michael R.  
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Locklear, Jefferson, MD, on the  
brief)

APPEARING FOR UNITED STATES of  
America

Steven Miskinis, Assistant Attorney  
General (William Lazarus, M. Alice  
Thurston, and Thomas L. Sansonetti,  
on the brief), United States  
Department of Justice, Environment  
and Natural Resources Division,  
Washington, DC

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern  
District of New York (Lawrence E. Kahn, District Judge).

**UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND  
DECREED** that the judgment of said district court be and it hereby is  
**AFFIRMED.**

1           The Marble Hill Oneida Indians ("the MHO") appeal an order  
2 denying their motion to intervene as of right pursuant to Fed. R.  
3 Civ. P. 24 (a)(2) or, in the alternative, to intervene by permission  
4 pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b). We affirm.

5           This Court reviews a district court's denial of a motion to  
6 intervene for abuse of discretion. United States v. City of New  
7 York, 198 F.3d 360, 364 (2d Cir. 1999). A district court abuses its  
8 discretion when "its decision rests on an error of law . . . or a  
9 clearly erroneous factual finding." Goodrich Corp. v. Town of  
10 Middlesbury, 311 F.3d 154, 169 (2d Cir. 2002).

11           To support a Rule 24(a) motion to intervene as of right, the  
12 proposed intervenor must "(1) file a timely motion; (2) show an  
13 interest in the litigation; (3) show that its interest may be  
14 impaired by the disposition of the action; and (4) show that its  
15 interest is not adequately protected by the parties to the action."  
16 See D'Amato v. Deutsche Bank, 236 F.3d 78, 84 (2d Cir. 2001)  
17 (citation and quotation marks omitted). The district court denied  
18 the MHO's motion to intervene as of right because it found that the  
19 MHO are part of the Oneida Indian Nation of New York ("OINNY"),

1 plaintiff in this action, and hence that their interests are  
2 adequately protected already. On appeal, the MHO challenge this  
3 conclusion, and marshal the following evidence in support of their  
4 argument that they are a separate tribe from the OINNY: (1)  
5 historical data, recorded in a Department of the Interior ("DOI")  
6 report chronicling the internal divisions of the Oneida; (2) the  
7 MHO's continued possession of certain portions of the original Oneida  
8 land reservation; and (3) purported separate recognition of the MHO  
9 by the DOI. The district court considered this evidence, but found  
10 that countervailing evidence established that the MHO are part of the  
11 OINNY and, hence, that the MHO were already represented in the  
12 action. We conclude that the district court's findings were not  
13 clearly erroneous.

14 The MHO also argue that the district court erred because it  
15 failed to apply a certain definition of "tribe" in its determination  
16 of whether the MHO were a part of the OINNY. We disagree. The MHO  
17 correctly observe that, for purposes of the Nonintercourse Act,  
18 courts define a tribe as "a body of Indians of the same or a similar  
19 race, united in a community under one leadership or government, and  
20 inhabiting a particular, though sometimes ill-defined, territory."  
21 Golden Hill Paugussett Tribe of Indians v. Weicker, 39 F.3d 51, 59  
22 (2d Cir. 1994) (quoting Montoya v. United States, 180 U.S. 261, 266  
23 (1901)). However, the MHO have failed to demonstrate that they are  
24 "united in a community under one leadership or government."

25 For these reasons, we conclude that the district court did not  
26 abuse its discretion by denying the MHO's motion to intervene as of  
27 right.

28 We also affirm the district court's denial of the MHO's motion  
29 for permissive intervention pursuant to Rule 24(b)(2). Permissive  
30 intervention may be granted "if the application is timely" and if the  
31 "applicant's claim or defense and the main action have a question of  
32 law or fact in common." Wiesshaus v. Swiss Bankers Ass'n, 225 F.3d  
33 191, 202 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(2)). The  
34 district court found that the MHO's motion was untimely and that  
35 their intervention would cause prejudice and delay. This law suit  
36 has been pending for more than thirty years, has been active for up  
37 to six years, and since January 2001 the parties have engaged in  
38 discovery and have filed and briefed numerous dispositive motions,  
39 most of which were decided in March 2002. We decline the invitation  
40 to reverse the district court's assessment that addition of an  
41 additional party at this point would cause prejudice and delay in  
42 this already-protracted lawsuit. See H.L. Hayden Co. v. Siemens Med.  
43 Sys., Inc., 797 F.2d 85, 89 (2d Cir. 1986) (district courts enjoy  
44 broad discretion in determining whether to grant a motion for  
45 permissive intervention).

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1 For the reasons set forth above, the judgment of the district  
2 court is hereby **AFFIRMED**.

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4 FOR THE COURT:  
5 Roseann B. MacKechnie, Clerk

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7  
8 By: \_\_\_\_\_  
9 Lucille Carr, Deputy Clerk